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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, 50,000 Rwandan refugees and local Burundis fled to the
border of Tanzania seeking safety, after gunmen attacked a refugee
camp in northern Burundi. According to the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees: "What happened next was unprecedented.
Rather than welcoming them as the country had regularly done in the
past, Dar as Salaam [Tanzania] deployed the army, closed its border
and effectively told the refugees to stay away."1 Strained by the local
and environmental pressures of hosting the 500,000 Rwandan refugees
that had arrived in 1994,2 Tanzania explained its change in policy:
"Protecting and assisting refugees has brought new risks to national
security, exacerbated tensions between states and caused extensive
damage to the environment. ... "3
In effect, Tanzania had invoked the concept of "state of necessity" as
an excuse for a border-closure that may have violated its duties under
international law. Other states, including Jordan and, most recently,
Macedonia, have also sought to justify border closures on necessity
grounds. 4 These kinds of border-closures, exposing asylum-seekers to
1. Augustine Mahiga, A Change of Direction for Tanzania, REFUGEES, Winter 1997,
14, 14.
2. Id. at 15 ("Law and order in refugee camps and the surrounding countryside
deteriorated precipitously. The local population was outnumbered 3-to-1 by refugees.
They watched with increasing frustration as large tracts of forest, rivers and arable land
were destroyed.").
3. Id. at 14 (quoting statement by Tanzania's Deputy Home Affairs Minister E.
Mwambulukutu).
4. Recently, Macedonia twice closed its borders to persons seeking refuge from
violence in their homeland. In 1997, the border was closed to refugees fleeing the civil
unrest in Albania. See, e.g., Julia Strauss & Robert Fox, Thousand Try to Flee Growing
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the risk of persecution that drove them from their homes in the first
place, violate the internationally prescribed duty of non-refoulement.
5
They not only facilitate the continuation of human rights abuse but also
undermine the system of asylum that has been the cornerstone of
protection for people whose rights could no longer be safeguarded in
their own countries.
In this Article I examine the concept of necessity as an excuse or
justification for a State's breach of an international legal obligation
from a practical and theoretical perspective. I will show that while the
concept of a state of necessity as understood by the International Law
Commission (ILC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may be
applicable in respect of non-fulfilment by States of human rights
obligations, the balancing test in the provisionally-adopted text of
article 33 of the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility 6 is designed
to weigh inconsistent interests of two States rather than interests of a
State against interests of a community of States and is thus ill-suited
for the context of erga omnes and multilateral obligations that human
rights norms entail. As a consequence, necessity, as expressed in the
current text of article 33, could too easily allow a State to excuse its
non-compliance with international human rights obligations in
situations of threat to an essential interest of the State. That is to say,
by way of a practical example, that a State could close its borders to a
large-scale influx of asylum-seekers and excuse its non-compliance with
its international duty not to expose asylum-seekers to the risk of
persecution by asserting that the influx would threaten an essential
State interest, such as the preservation of internal order and security.
In Part II, I trace the development of the necessity excuse from its
seventeenth-century manifestation to its current codification in article
Chaos in Tirana, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 14, 1997, at 15. Two years later, Macedonia
closed its borders to keep out those driven from Yugoslavia's Kosovo province by Serbian
atrocities and NATO air raids. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Weather Breaking, and Allies
Seek to Intensify Bombing., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1999, at Al, A6. In 1998, when tension was
rising between Iraq and the Security Council over the weapons inspection regime, Crown
Prince Hassan explained why Jordan would have to close its borders to asylum-seekers
from Iraq: "We are talking about the possibility of hundreds of thousands of refugees
moving in the direction of the borders of Iraq's neighbors. Of course that is a position that
has compelled us to say we would be forced to close the border; we simply cannot absorb
further hundreds of thousands of refugees." Jay Bushinsky, US Dismisses Latest Iraqi
Proposal, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at 1. For discussion of other instances of border
closures to prevent a mass influx of asylum-seekers, see James C. Hathaway & R.
Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 124-25 (1997).
5. For a discussion of the duty of non-refoulement, see infra Section IV(A).
6. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-Seventh
Session, U.N. Doc. A/10010/Rev.1 (1975), reprinted in [1975] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMVIM'N 47,
51-59, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.Al1975/Add.1 (reviewing the historical development of the
articles); Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second
Session, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2, 1, 26-
34, U.N. Doc.AICN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2) (adopting the text of articles 1 through
35) [hereinafter ILC Draft Article].
2000]
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33 of the ILC's Draft Articles of State Responsibility. I then set forth, in
Part III, the constituent elements of necessity as embodied in draft
article 33, drawing on the ICJ's interpretation of it in the recent
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros decision,7 in which draft article 33 was
recognized to "reflectU customary international law."8 To aid in the
analysis and to demonstrate that necessity must not be dismissed as a
stale legal construct, but rather that it should be appreciated as a
matter of vital importance to human rights protection, I then apply, in
Part IV, the concept of necessity expressed in draft article 33 as a
justification for a State's border-closure to prevent a large-scale influx
of asylum-seekers. I choose the border-closure scenario because of its
periodic recurrence in the practice of States and because of its corrosive
effects on human rights protection of large numbers of people.
By conclusion, I urge a reconception of the current necessity
balancing test that, rather than weighing only the specific inconsistent
interests of two States, would take into account the interests of the
community of States in situations where erga omnes and multilateral
human rights obligations are at stake. Such a construction would
prohibit, or at least severely restrict, the use of the necessity
justification in situations where human rights were involved.
Importantly, this change was proposed to the International Law
Commission in 1999. It is uncertain, however, that the ILC will
ultimately adopt this change in its final draft articles on state
responsibility. Failure to do so would lead to perverse outcomes in
international human rights law and to wider human rights abuse by
States in abdication of their international responsibilities.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF NECESSITY: FROM
"SELF-PRESERVATION" TO "ESSENTIAL INTEREST"
A. The Early Doctrine of Necessity: A State's Right to Self-Preservation
Necessity, it seems, was from long ago coupled with the notion of
self-preservation. That is to say, when a threat to self-preservation
arose, it was considered justified to take any steps necessary to
preserve one's existence, even if such steps would have been unlawful
had they been taken in the absence of a threat to self-preservation.
Writing in the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius observed that many
nations recognized the right to self-preservation in their internal law:
"The Jewish law... , no less than the Roman, acting upon the same
principle of tenderness forbids us to kill anyone, who has taken our
goods, unless for the preservation of our own lives." 9 For Grotius, widely
7. Case Concerning the Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
92 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project].
8. Id. para. 52.
9. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS, LIBRI TRES bk. II, ch. I, para. XII, cl. 3
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considered the "father of international law," this principle was equally
applicable to inter-state relations. In the context of war, for example, he
wrote that when the exigencies of war make it necessary for one power
to occupy neutral soil, such as when the enemy's occupation of that
territory would pose a threat to its power, it may occupy the territory in
the exercise of a right of necessity. 10
Grotius did not, however, leave the exercise of the right of necessity
unencumbered.1 ' He emphasized the narrowness of the circumstances
in which a state would be justified in invoking a right of necessity to
undertake otherwise unlawful acts. When writing about the rights of
neutral powers during a war, for example, he stressed that "nothing
short of extreme exigency can give one power a right over what belongs
to another no way involved in the war."' 2 At the same time, "even where
the emergency can be plainly proved, nothing can justify. .. taking or
applying the property of [the neutral power], beyond the immediate
demands of that emergency."' 3 Moreover, "no emergency can justify any
one in taking and applying to his own use what the owner stands in
equal need of himself."' 4 And, finally, when the exigency passes, the
property must be returned to the neutral state15 and "full value should
be paid" for the difference in condition or amount of the returned
property. 16 From these and similar passages, Rodick identified the
following conditions inherent in the Grotian concept of necessity:
1. There must be an absence of mens rea on the part of one who
exercises the alleged right [of necessity].
2. There must be a real and vital danger, either to life, or to
property.
3. The danger must be imminent in point of time.
4. In seizing the property of neutrals the amount seized should
be no greater than is necessary for the particular object in
view.
5. Consideration must be given to the equities involved ....
6. The person who has exercised the right [of necessity] is
(A.C. Campbell trans., 1901).
10. See id. at bk. II, ch. II, para. X.
11. See BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5-6 (1928).
12. GROTIUS, supra note 9, at bk. III, ch. VII, para. I (emphasis added).
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Id. at bk. II, ch. II, para. X.
16. Id. at bk. III, ch. VII, para. I.
2000]
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bound whenever possible to make restitution or give an
equivalent to the owner.
17
The Grotian understanding of necessity as a right resonated in the
thinking of nineteenth century scholars who propounded the notion
that States possess certain fundamental rights, including the right to
existence and the attendant right to self-preservation.18 Typical of the
time are the writings of Travers Twiss, who wrote: "Of the Primary and
Absolute Rights of a nation the most essential, and as it were the
Cardinal Right, upon which all others hinge, is that of Self-
Preservation. This Right necessarily involves, as subordinate Rights, all
other Rights which are essential as means to secure this principal
end."'19 The assumption that existence and self-preservation were rights
of States led to the notion that when a State's existence was threatened,
the State could, as a matter of right, take action aimed at preserving
itself, even if that action was incongruent with its international
obligations. 20 Thus, Hershey wrote that "[i]n order to protect and
preserve this right [to self-preservation], [a State] may in extreme cases
of necessity commit what would ordinarily be an infraction of the Law
of Nations and violate the territorial sovereignty or international right
of another State ....
Yet, conceptualizing self-preservation as a right introduces a
serious practical difficulty when a decisionmaker has to decide which of
two rights of two States is of more weight-the right of a State to have
its international rights honored or the right of another State to breach
those rights in the exercise of its right of self-preservation. Charles
Fenwick captured the attendant quagmire well when he wrote that
"[t]he conflict of international rights thus resulting is governed by a few
general principles of law, which are, however, so vague as to leave it an
open question in many cases whether the right of one has justified a
breach of the right of the other."22 Contemporary international law has
17. RODICK, supra note 11, at 6 (citations omitted).
18. See Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago,
U.N. Doc. AICN.4/318/ADD.5-7, reprinted in 1980 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N vol. II, pt. 1, 13,
16, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Ago Report]; see
also AMOS S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 231 (1927) ("The most important of these fundamental rights of States is
that of existence, which involves the rights of self-preservation and defense.").
19. TRAVERS TwIss, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES 179 (2d ed. 1884); see also I WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
150-51 (A. Berriedale Keith ed., 6th ed. 1929); CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 142-43 (1924) ("The right of existence, or of self-preservation, is recognized by
international law as the primary right of states, being the necessary postulate of the
possession of all other rights.").
20. See Ago Report, supra note 18, at 16, para. 7.
21. HERSHEY, supra note 18, at 232.
22. FENWICK, supra note 19, at 142-43. Fenwick went on to observe that the
consequence of this clash of two rights of States in "the absence of an international
authority competent to give effective sanction to international law, [is that] the right of
6
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partly responded to this problem by dispensing with the notion of
necessity as a "right," in favor of a notion that self-preservation and
other "essential interests" may be used to "excuse" internationally
wrongful conduct under certain limited circumstances.
B. The Modern Necessity Doctrine: A State's Excuse in the Name of an
"Essential Interest"
At the request of the ILC, Professor Roberto Ago, who was 10
subsequently appointed as judge of the International Court of Justice,
prepared a comprehensive study in the 1970s on the concept of
necessity in international law. His seminal study lends insight into the
modern necessity doctrine upon which the drafters of article 33 relied.
Importantly, Ago rejects the notion of self-preservation and necessity as
rights of States. 23 Instead, he marshals doctrinal support from
international tribunals for the claim that necessity is not a right
emanating from the right of self-preservation, but rather an excuse to
breach a State's international obligation when necessary to protect an
essential interest.24 The "excuse" conception of necessity provides a
partial way out of Fenwick's quagmire: in invoking necessity, a State
does not assert a right in defense of its violation of the right of another
existence on part of small states has been at times precarious; and on occasion ... it has
been no more than a legal fiction." Id. at 143.
23. Regarding the right of a state to self preservation, Ago argues that "[t]he theory of
'fundamental rights' of States ... was the product of pure abstract speculation with no
basis in international legal reality, and has since become outdated; in particular, the idea
of a right of 'self-preservation' has been completely abandoned." Ago Report, supra note
18, at 17, para. 7. Similarly, "the idea of a subjective right of necessity, which may have
been marginally acceptable in times when the science of law had not yet refined its
concepts, is absolute nonsense today." Id. at 16, para. 9. Of course, Ago is not alone in
criticizing the view of necessity and self-preservation as rights. See, e.g., DEREK W.
BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 10 (1958) ('That view, by which the
whole of the duties of states are subordinated to the 'right' of self-preservation or the
'right' of necessity, is destructive of the entire legal order.") (citations omitted); Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 RECUEIL DES
COURs 344 (1/1955) ("If self-preservation were an absolute and overriding right, the rest of
international law would become optional, and its observance would depend on a self-
denying ordinance, revocable at will by each State, not to invoke this formidable super-
right.").
24. The difference between these two positions is that in invoking necessity as an
excuse, the acting State merely seeks to excuse its denial of another State's legitimate
legal claim against it, whereas if necessity were understood to be a right, the acting
State's reliance on it would amount to a legal claim against the other State. See Ago
Report, supra note 18, para. 15.
In support of Ago's position that necessity is not a right but an excuse, see, for
example, Schwarzenberger, supra note 23, at 343 ("Sufficient evidence exists to permit
the statement that, in international law, necessity may excuse non-observance of
international obligations.... [N]ecessity does not give any right, but may provide a good
excuse."); BOWETT, supra note 23, at 10 (acknowledging the limited role of necessity as a
concept "justifying conduct which, though not lawful (and therefore distinct from self-
defence) is yet excusable .... ").
2000]
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State, but rather asserts that, under the circumstances, international
law should excuse its conduct.
25
The practice of international adjudicative bodies, as surveyed by
Ago26 and Bin Cheng,27 demonstrates the recognition in international
law of necessity as an excuse for a State's nonperformance of an
international obligation. One early instructive case is that of The
Neptune,28 an American vessel laden with foodstuffs bound for France, a
nation then at war with Britain. Captured by a British warship, The
Neptune was taken to a British port where its cargo was seized
pursuant to an order extending to neutral vessels bound for enemy
ports. 29 The British Government took the cargo, paying the invoice price
plus a ten percent profit.30 Claiming the difference between the amount
paid and the amount they would have received had the cargo reached
its intended destination, 31 the owners of the American vessel brought a
claim against the British government to an arbitral commission
established under the Jay Treaty. 32 The Commission upheld the
shipowners' claim and granted the requested relief 3 3 In so doing, it
summarily rejected Britain's argument that its action was justified by
necessity-that is, that the seizure of cargo was justified by the alleged
scarcity of foodstuffs in Britain at the time.
34
12 Two of the arbitral commissioners, applying the concept of necessity
to the facts of the case, found that the facts did not justify a legitimate
reliance on necessity. Mr. Pinkney wrote in his opinion:
I shall not deny that extreme necessity may justify such a
measure [seizure of foodstuffs]. It is only important to ascertain
whether that extreme necessity existed on this occasion and
upon what terms the right it communicated might be carried
into exercise.
We are told by Grotius that the necessity must not be
imaginary, that it must be real and pressing, and that even
then it does not give a right of appropriating the goods of others
until all other means of relief consistent with the necessity have
25. See Ago Report, supra note 18, at 20, para. 15.
26. See id. at 21, paras. 19 et seq.
27. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 69-77 (1953).
28.- The Neptune, reprinted in IV INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS: MODERN SERIES
372 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1931) (decided in 1797). For accounts of the case, see BIN
CHENG, supra note 27, at 70-71, and Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 48.
29. See The Neptune, supra note 28, at 372.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 372.
32. See id.
33. See id at 441.
34. See id. at 398.
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been tried and found inadequate. 35
Mr. Trumbull expressed a similar understanding of the limits of 13
necessity.
36
Although both commissioners, writing in the eighteenth century, 14
viewed necessity as a right, Bin Cheng draws out several aspects of The
Neptune decision that are common to decisions of international
tribunals going into the twentieth century:
1. When the existence of a State is in peril, the necessity of self-
preservation may be a good defence for certain acts which
would otherwise be unlawful.
2. This necessity "supersedes all laws," "dissolves the
distinctions of property and rights" and justifies the "seizure
and application to our own use of that which belongs to
others."
3. This necessity must be "absolute" in that the very existence
of the State is in peril.
4. This necessity must be "irresistible" in that all legitimate
means of self-preservation have been exhausted and proved
to be of no avail.
5. This necessity must be actual and not merely apprehended.
6. Whether or not the above conditions are fulfilled in a given
case, is a proper subject of judicial inquiry. If they are not,
the act will be regarded as unlawful and damages will be
assessed in accordance with principles governing reparation
for unlawful acts.
3 7
These six features bear a strong resemblance to the Grotian view of
necessity. The- only significant differences between the Grotian-
influenced conception of necessity in The Neptune decision and
necessity as sketched out in the opinions of modern adjudicative bodies
35. Id. at 398-99 (opinion of Mr. Pinkney) (emphases in original).
36. Mr. Trumbull writes:
The necessity which can be admitted to supersede all laws and to
dissolve the distinctions of property and right must be absolute and
irresistible, and we cannot, until all other means of self-preservation
shall have been exhausted, justify by the plea of necessity the seizure
and application to our own use of that which belongs to others.
Id. at 433 (opinion of Mr. Trumbull).
37. See BIN CHENG, supra note 27, at 71.
2000]
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are that necessity is no longer considered to be a right 38 and that its
legitimate use is not anymore dependent on the existence of a link with
self-preservation, meaning preservation of the very existence of the
State.39
16 Although a link between preservation of a State's very existence
and the plea of necessity as an excuse for noncompliance with an
international obligation of the State has been intimated in several
cases, 40 the predominant trend in more recent practice is to expand the
notion of necessity to cover "essential interests" other than threats to a
State's very existence. 41 Illustrative in this regard is the ILC's
characterization of The Torrey Canyon incident. In 1967, The Torrey
Canyon, a Liberian tanker carrying 117,000 tons of crude oil, ran
aground off the coast of Cornwall, but outside British territorial
waters.42 The oil began to leak into the sea through a hole in the hull of
the vessel, posing a threat to the English coast and its population. 43 As
The Torrey Canyon began to break apart, the British government was
faced with the risk that the entire cargo of oil would spill out into the
38. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
39. On this point Ago observed that the predominant opinion today holds that "the
concept of state of necessity can be invoked above all to preclude wrongfulness of conduct
adopted in certain conditions in order to protect an essential interest of the State, without
its existence being in any way threatened." Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 8 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 22 (pointing to the Russian Indemnity
Case, in which the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected the Ottoman government's
claim of necessity to justify its failure to pay its debt to Russia. as evidence that the Court
recognized the necessity defense as international law, "but only within very strict limits:
"compliance with an international obligation must be 'self-destructive' ); para. 26
(discussing the French Company of Venezuela Railroads Case, in which the
FrenchlVenezuelan Mixed Claims Commission accepted Venezuela's argument that it had
been forced to annul the concessions it granted to the French company because Colombia's
claim on much of the area granted posed "the real danger of war").
41. See Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 23 (discussing the Forests of Central Rhodope
Case, and concluding that the resolution reached by Greece and Bulgaria before the
Council of the League of Nations showed that "the two Governments seem to have clearly
recognized that a situation of necessity such as one consisting of very serious financial
difficulties could justify, if not the repudiation by a state of an international debt, at least
recourse to means of fulfilling the obligation other than that actually envisaged by in the
obligation"); para. 32 (discussing the Properties of Bulgarian Minorities in Greece Case, in
which the League of Nations Committee of Enquiry accepted Greece's plea of necessity
based on the claim that it violated the Treaty of Sbvres vis-A-vis Bulgaria in order to
"safeguard an interest which it deemed essential, namely, the provision of immediate
shelter for its nationals who were pouring into its territory in search of refuge"); para. 42
(discussing the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco Case, a
case before the International Court of Justice in which France defended its breach of its
treaty obligations to the United States on the ground that non-compliance was necessary
to its "fundamental economic balance").
42. See Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 35 (describing the incident); see also Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, U.N. Doc.
A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2, 1, 26-34, U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1980lAdd.1 (Part 2), para. 15 [hereinafter Commentary].
43. Id.
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sea. 44 After various attempts at averting the impending disaster failed,
the British bombed the vessel in order to burn off the oil remaining on
board.45 In this case, it is clear that the danger of the oil spill did not
pose a threat to the very existence of Great Britain. Rather, the spill
threatened one of the state's interests, namely, the protection of the
marine and coastal environment. In its commentary on draft article 33
(Commentary),46 the ILC referred to the British Government's
destruction of The Torrey Canyon, stating:
Whatever other possible justifications there may have been for
the British Government's action, it seems to the Commission
that, even if the shipowner had not abandoned the wreck and
even if he had tried to oppose its destruction, the action taken
by the British Government would have had to be recognized as
internationally lawful because of a state of necessity.4 7
The ILC's response to Britain's action in The Torrey Canyon 17
incident-recognizing, in effect, an excuse of environmental necessity-
demonstrates the view that necessity is not inextricably linked to
preserving the very existence of the State, but that it may be
legitimately relied upon in a broader set of circumstances; namely,
when one of the State's essential interests is threatened.48
In 1997, in the Gabjikovo-Nagymaros Case,49 the International 18
Court of Justice strongly reaffirmed this emphasis on "essential
interest" rather than existence in the modern doctrine of the state of
necessity. The case arose out of a project undertaken by Hungary and
Czechoslovakia (and later Slovakia) to develop a system of dams and
locks on the Danube River to generate electricity, improve navigation,
and protect against flooding. 50 Twelve years into the vast project, which
had been consummated by a treaty ratified by the respective States,
Hungary first suspended and then abandoned its treaty obligations,
claiming that the project posed grave risks to the environment in the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Commentary, supra note 42.
47. Id. at 39, para. 15.
48. For a discussion of the ILC's conception of what constitutes an essential interest
for the purposes of necessity, see infra Section III(A).
49. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, paras. 49-58. For an analysis of
this case see, for example, Colleen P. Graffy, Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to
Drink: The Urgency of Transnational Solutions to International Riparian Disputes, 10
GEO. INT'L ENV'TL. L. REV. 399, 431-440 (1998); Johan G. Lammers, The Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Case Seen in Particular From the Perspective of the Law of International
Watercourses and the Protection of the Environment, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 287 (1998), and
Ren6 Lefeber, The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project and the Law of State Responsibility, 11
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 609 (1998).
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region and to the water supply of Budapest. 5 1 Czechoslovakia brought
suit before the International Court of Justice to seek redress. In
justification of its breach of the treaty terms, Hungary largely relied on
the existence of a state of ecological necessity.52 Significantly, although
the ICJ ultimately held that Hungary had not met its burden of
establishing a state of necessity,5 3 the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the threat of an ecological catastrophe could establish
a state of necessity, and that such necessity could provide a valid excuse
for a State's conduct in violation of its international obligations.
19 This brief overview of the development of the concept of necessity in
international law provides context for the ILC's attempt to codify the
concept of necessity over the past fifty years. Taking into account the
evolution of necessity through doctrine and practice, the ILC's work
culminated in the provisional adoption of article 33 of the ILC's Draft
Articles of State Responsibility.
III. THE CONCEPT OF NECESSITY EMBODIED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE ILC's
DRAFT ARTICLES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
20 In 1980, twenty-five years into its efforts to codify State practice
with respect to the concept of necessity, the International Law
Commission provisionally adopted the text of article 33 of the Draft
Articles of State Responsibility [hereinafter draft article 331.54 The
significance of adoption by the ILC of a draft text bears remarking on.
The U.N. Charter empowers the U.N. General Assembly to "initiate
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging
the progressive development of international law and its codification." 55
To discharge its responsibility in this regard, the General Assembly
created the ILC in 1947.56 The ILC is made up of thirty-four experts
elected by the General Assembly in their individual capacity. 57 Since
beginning its work in 1949, the ILC has established itself as the
preeminent authority on codification of international law. 58 At the
direction of the General Assembly, it has studied key topics of
international law and prepared texts that were the bases of such
51. See id. paras. 22-40 (describing the Hungarian claim of state of ecological
necessity in justification of abandoning the project).
52. See id. para. 40. Hungary also advanced arguments founded on other grounds,
including "the impossibility of performance of the [underlying] Treaty; ... the occurrence
of a fundamental change of circumstances; ... the material breach of the [underlying]
Treaty by Czechoslovakia; and.., the development of new norms of international
environmental law." Graffy, supra note 49, at 434.
53. See Gabiikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, para. 57.
54. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 13(1)(a).
56. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), Nov. 21, 1947.
57. See Carl-August Fleischhauer, Article 13, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 265, 268-69 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995).
58. See, e.g., Paul Szasz, General Law-Making Process, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL
ORDER 35, 45, 78 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
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landmark treaties as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, and the
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 59
The topic of State responsibility has been on the ILC's agenda since 21
its first session in 1949. Following the General Assembly's request that
the Commission codify international law on the subject, the
Commission undertook the challenge, appointing a Special Rapporteur
on State Responsibility in 1955. Draft article 33 is part of that ongoing
project.60 Importantly, in turning to the ILC's Commentary on draft
article 33 in the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Case, the International Court of
Justice concluded that draft article 33 "reflect[s] customary law."6' The
ILC's work on necessity thus clearly represents an authoritative
statement on the topic. 62
The draft article reflects the understanding of Professor Ago, 63 ILC 22
member and Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility from 1963 to
1979, that necessity is a circumstance excusing the wrongfulness of a
breach of an international obligation, not a right to be exercised at the
discretion of the State acting in self-preservation. 64 Entitled "State of
Necessity," draft article 33 provides in paragraph 1:
1. A State of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that
State not in conformity with an international obligation of
the State unless:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential
interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril;
and
59. See Fleischhauer, supra note 57, at 270.
60. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-First
Session, 3 May-23 July 1999, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10, para. 49 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 ILC Report]. The draft article 33 discussed here is in the form the ILC
provisionally adopted upon its first reading. The ILC's provisional adoption of a text upon
a first reading comes only after a topic is placed on the agenda of the ILC, a rapporteur is
appointed to study and prepare a report on the topic, and that report is reviewed,
discussed, and, if necessary, revised by the Commission. Once the Commission agrees on
the draft text, it formally adopts it and presents it to States for comments. After States
have had an opportunity to comment, the ILC resumes its work. In a process known as
the second reading, it takes account of the various comments and prepares a final draft of
the text that it then conveys to the General Assembly with recommendations for the form
of its adoption. See Fleischhauer, supra note 57, at 269.
61. See Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, para. 52. Recently, the ILC noted
that "[a] rticle 33 was referred to by both parties in the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project case,
and [that] the Court expressly endorsed it as a statement of general international law."
1999 ILC Report, supra note 60, para. 374.
62. Lammers even argues that the ICJ not only considered the concept of necessity
"but also the description of its criteria by the [JLC] ... as part and parcel of existing
customary international law." Lammers, supra note 49, at 299.
63. See Commentary, supra note 42, paras. 1, 4.
64. See Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 77.
2000]
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(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of
the State towards which the obligation existed.6 5
23 The remainder of article 33 prescribes further limitations on the use
of necessity, which is consistent with Ago's view and the current
doctrine that the excuse of necessity "is absolutely of an exceptional
nature."66 Thus, the second paragraph stipulates:
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a
State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness:
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the
State is not in conformity arises out of a peremptory norm
of general international law; or
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the
State is not in conformity is laid down by a treaty which,
explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of
invoking the state of necessity with respect to that
obligation; or
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence
of the state of necessity.
6 7
24 Based on draft article 33, then, two sets of questions must be
addressed in determining whether a State may validly invoke the
necessity excuse. The first set, pursuant to draft article 33(1), includes:
(i) whether an "essential interest" is at stake; (ii) whether the threat to
such an interest rises to the level of "grave and imminent peril"; (iii)
whether the State had other means of safeguarding the interest; and,
finally, (iv) the balance of interests involved. The second set of
questions, referred to in draft article 33(2), entails exceptions to the
availability of the necessity defense under special circumstances. Thus,
even when the first set of questions is resolved in favor of the violating
State, the necessity defense will be unavailable where: (i) a peremptory
norm of general international law is involved; (ii) nonderogation clauses
in the relevant treaty exclude the possibility of invoking the necessity
defense; or (iii) the State in question has contributed to the state of
necessity. While the latter questions will be addressed in Part IV, I now
turn to consider the first set of questions in some detail.
65. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(1).
66. Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 12.
67. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(2).
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A. The Meaning of "Essential Interest" in the Context of Article 33
The first thing that may be noticed about draft article 33 is that it 2.
speaks about "safeguarding an essential interest" of the State, not its
very existence.68 In its Commentary, the ILC expressly referred to this
distinction, stating that the "essential interest" requirement "does not
mean that the Commission considered the interest in question to be
solely a matter of the 'existence' of the State."69 Ago made the same
point. 70 He emphasized that, given that a successful necessity defense
effectively allows an interest of a State to defeat a right of another
State, the defense must be of an exceptional nature.71 But, he is careful
to note that the class of interests on which a plea of necessity may be
based is not limited to interests in preserving the existence of the
State.72
Following Ago's model, 73 the ILC declined to enumerate "essential 26
interests" of a State for purposes of article 33, noting that the extent to
which a given interest is essential to a State depends on the
circumstances of the case at hand.7 4 Importantly, however, Ago gives
examples of the sort of interests that would satisfy article 33, including
a State's "political or economic survival, the continued functioning of its
essential services, the maintenance of internal peace, the survival of a
sector of its population, [and] the preservation of the environment of its
territory or a part thereof."
75
In the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Case, the ICJ made clear that a 2
State's protection of its environment, even when limited to a particular
region rather than the whole of the State's territory, constitutes an
essential interest of the State within the meaning of article 33 of the
ILC Draft. 76 It is thus no longer open to question whether various
interests of a State going well beyond preservation of its very existence
constitute essential interests for the purposes of a legitimate plea of
necessity as an excuse for internationally unlawful conduct. 77
68. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(1)(a) (emphasis added).
69. Commentary, supra note 42, at 49, para. 32.
70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71. See Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 12.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Commentary, supra note 42, para. 3.
75. See Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 2.
76. The ICJ states: 'The Court has no difficulty in acknowledging that the concerns
expressed by Hungary for its natural environment in the region affected by the
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project related to an 'essential interest' of that State, within the
meaning given to that expression in Article 33 of the Draft of the International Law
Commission." Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, para. 53.
77. Schachter has argued, for example, that terrorist acts, whether threatened or
actually carried out, may give rise to a legitimate reliance on necessity on the part of the
target State, provided that the terrorist acts would "take lives, disrupt internal order or
interfere with essential services," or otherwise threaten an essential interest of the target
State. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (1991);
2000]
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B. The Meaning of "Grave and Imminent Peril" in the Context of Article
33
28 As reflected in draft article 33, however, international law requires
not only that the threat be to a State's essential interest, but also that
the threat rise to the level of "grave and imminent peril" before steps
taken to protect the interest may be justified on grounds of necessity.
Neither the ILC Commentary nor Ago's Report specify criteria by which
to measure "gravity" to determine whether the "peril" falls within the
meaning of article 33. Rather, both Ago and the ILC resort to the more
general notion that the danger to the essential interest of the State
must be "extremely grave,"78 a vestige of the Grotian qualification of
necessity that. "nothing short of extreme exigency" can serve to justify
otherwise unlawful conduct. 79
29 In regard to the imminence prong, the ILC rather vaguely refers to
"imminent peril" as "a threat to the interest at the actual time."8 0
Similarly, Ago writes that "imminent peril" is "a present danger to the
threatened interest."S1 In its opinion in the Gabjikovo-Nagymaros Case,
the ICJ sought to further draw out the meaning of the term.8 2 As to the
"imminence" of the peril, the Court observed that 'imminence' is
synonymous with 'immediacy' or 'proximity' and goes far beyond the
concept of 'possibility."'8 3 The Court interpreted "peril" as referring to
danger in as much as it "evokes the idea of 'risk"' rather than "material
damage."8 4 The Court concluded that Hungary's necessity claim failed
to satisfy the "imminence" prong, reasoning that the dangers to the
environment allegedly inherent in the project were not sufficiently
established at the time of the breach.8 5
C. The Requirement that the Act be the "Only Means"Available to the
State to Safeguard its Interest
30 Consistent with the view that necessity justifies otherwise unlawful
conduct only in the most exceptional circumstances, international law
see also Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force by a State against Terrorists in Another
Country, 1989 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 209, 225-30.
78. See Commentary, supra note 42, at 49, para. 33; Ago Report, supra note 18, para.
13.
79. See GROTIUS, supra note 9, at bk. III, ch. VII, para. I (emphasis added). This is
also one of the conditions identified by Rodick from the writings of Grotius. See supra text
accompanying note 17 (the second point).
80. Commentary, supra note 42, para. 33.
81. Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 13.
82. See Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, paras. 54-57.
83. Id. para. 54. The Court further states that "a state of necessity could not exist
without a 'peril' duly established at the relevant point in time; the mere apprehension of a
possible 'peril' could not suffice in that respect." Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. paras. 55-57.
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requires that the acting State had no alternative but to engage in the
unlawful conduct in order to protect its essential interest.8 6 Thus,
article 33 of the ILC Draft Articles of State Responsibility conditions
invocation of a state of necessity by stipulating that the otherwise
unlawful act of the State must be "the only means" of safeguarding an
essential interest.8 7 In its Commentary, the ILC stressed its strict
understanding that "the only means" test implies that "the peril must
not have been escapable by any other means, even a more costly one,
that could be adopted in compliance with international obligations."88s
The ICJ adopted the ILC's view of the "only means" requirement in
the Gabjikovo-Nagymaros Case. In denying Hungary's claim of the
existence of a state of necessity, the Court relied in part on its finding
that means other than breaching international obligations were
available to Hungary to safeguard its interest in protecting the
environment in the region as well as the supply of drinking water to
Budapest.8 9 In particular, the Court stated that the cost of the possible
alternatives to internationally unlawful conduct is not a determinative
factor in evaluating whether the unlawful conduct was the only means
open to the State to protect its interests. 90 Presumably, if an alternative
86. Bin Cheng, for example, identified in international practice the requirement that
all other alternatives must be exhausted before a State can invoke necessity to justify
internationally unlawful conduct. See supra text accompanying note 37, particularly point
4. Bin Cheng wrote on this point: "If, after every conceivable legal means of self-
preservation has been first exhausted, the very existence of the State is still in danger, and
if there exists only one single means of escaping from such danger, the State is justified in
having recourse to that means in self-preservation, even though it may otherwise be
unlawful." BIN CHENG, supra note 27, at 74 (emphases added); see also Ago Report, supra
note 18, paras. 41, 48 (demonstrating the presence of this requirement in the Oscar Chinn
Case, 1931, and the Neptune Case, 1797, respectively). From a doctrinal point of view, Ago
opined that:
The adoption by a State of conduct not in conformity with an
international obligation towards another State must truly be the only
means available to it for averting the extremely grave and imminent
peril which it fears; in other words, it must be impossible for the peril
to be averted by any other means, even one which is much more
onerous but which can be adopted without a breach of international
obligations.
Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 14 (citation omitted).
87. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(1)(a) (emphasis added).
88. Commentary, supra note 42, at 49, para. 33 (emphasis added).
89. See Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, paras. 55-57 ("The Court
moreover considers that Hungary could... have resorted to other means in order to
respond to the dangers that it apprehended.").
90. In this regard the Court wrote:
The Court would stress, however, that, even supposing, as Hungary
maintained, that the construction and operation of the dam would
have created serious risks, Hungary had means available to it, other
than the suspension and abandonment of the works, of responding to
that situation. It could for example have proceeded regularly to
discharge gravel into the river downstream of the dam. It could
likewise, if necessary, have supplied Budapest with drinking water by
processing the river water in an appropriate manner. The two Parties
expressly recognized that that possibility remained open even
17
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to the unlawful conduct existed, the State would be expected to resort to
it, even though in doing so it would incur additional expenses. The ICJ
did not define the limits of the proposition that cost is not a
determinative factor, but the Court's reasoning in evaluating Hungary's
necessity claim, would justify limiting the proposition to situations
when the additional cost of the alternative is not of such magnitude as
to render resort to it a threat to an essential interest of the State in
itself.
D. The "Balancing"Requirement
32 The final element of a valid claim of state of necessity as an excuse
for internationally wrongful conduct is that "the act did not seriously
impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation
existed."91 This requirement involves the balancing of the competing
interests of two States: on the one hand, the interest in the name of
which the defending State invokes necessity and, on the other, the
harm done to the interest of the State claiming a breach of
international law.92 A plea of necessity is valid only if the scales tip in
favor of the essential interest of the State that has acted unlawfully:
"[T]he interest sacrificed on the altar of 'necessity' must obviously be
less important than the interest it is thereby sought to save.."
93
In his analysis of international practice with respect to necessity,
Bin Cheng concludes that the balancing test plays a central role in the
determination of whether a State may defend its violation of
international law on the ground of necessity. Explaining the purpose
behind balancing, he writes:
The law of necessity is a means of preserving social values. It is
though-and this is not determinative of the state of necessity-the
purification of the river water, like the other measures envisaged,
clearly would have been a more costly technique.
Id. para. 55 (emphasis added).
91. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(1)(b). While the Court in the Gabdikovo-
Nagymaros Case did not have the occasion to balance the interests of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia on the facts presented in the case (because the other preconditions to
applying necessity had not been met), the Court clearly indicated that the balancing test
is a part of the concept of necessity in international law. See Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros
Project, supra note 7, para. 58.
92. Although the language of draft article 33 does not explicitly prescribe a balancing
test, balancing of the competing interests has been an element of the concept of necessity
at least since the time of Grotius. See GROTIUS, supra note 9, bk. III, ch. VII, para. ("[N]o
emergency can justify any one taking and applying to his own use what the owner stands
in equal need of himself.").
93. Commentary, supra note 42, para. 35 (emphasis added); see also Ago Report, supra
note 18, para. 15. ("The interest protected by the subjective right vested in the foreign
State, which is to be sacrificed for the sake of an 'essential interest' of the obligated State,
must obviously be inferior to that other interest .... [T]he interest in question cannot be
one which is comparable and equally essential to the foreign State concerned.").
18
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the great disparity in the importance of the interests actually in
conflict that alone justifies a reversal of the legal protection
normally accorded to these interests, so that a socially
important interest shall not perish for the sake of respect for an
objectively minor right. In every case, a comparison of the
conflicting interests appears to be indispensable.9
4
To state that the balancing requirement serves to preserve social
values, however, begs the question of what the content of "social values"
is. The ILC's formulation of the balancing test defines the relevant
"social values" in terms of the interests of the two States. The necessity
balancing test set out in article 33 presumes that the plea of necessity
arises only in bilateral contexts, that is, in situations where the
interests of two States are directly in conflict 95
Although a bilateral paradigm for necessity may have been
sufficient in the time of Grotius, it is too simplistic for the present: the
paradigm fails to account for the advent of human rights law from the
middle of the twentieth century and the resulting creation of erga
omnes obligations. The inadequacy of the ILC's balancing test is
brought into sharp relief by an evaluation of how a claim of state of
necessity would fare as a justification for a State's closing of its borders
to an influx of asylum-seekers.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NECESSITY TO JUSTIFY A STATE'S
CLOSURE OF ITS BORDERS TO PREVENT A LARGE-SCALE INFLUX OF
ASYLUM-SEEKERS
The question of invoking state of necessity in defense of a border 36
closure arises only if international law imposes an obligation on States
not to reject asylum-seekers from their frontiers. I address that
question below, concluding that several widely-accepted multilateral
treaties, as well as customary international law, impose such an
obligation. Having concluded that international law proscribes exposing
asylum-seekers to persecution, including by rejection from frontiers and
closure of borders (even in cases of a potentially large-scale influx), I
turn to the question of whether a State could justify such action by
raising the claim of necessity. Finding that draft article 33, as currently
written, could indeed be used to excuse a breach of the duty not to
return or expose people to persecution, I argue that the concept of
necessity should be reformulated to better take into account the
community interest in safeguarding human rights protections.
94. BIN CHENG, supra note 27, at 74 (emphasis added).
95. The language of article 33 itself states this in as much as it sets out the balancing
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A. International Obligations of the State of Asylum in the Face of a
Mass Influx of Asylum-Seekers96
37 Several international instruments prohibit refoulement, that is,
returning or exposing individuals to the imminent risk of persecution
elsewhere. The duty of non-refoulement is expressed in binding and
non-binding international and regional instruments and is accepted in
the municipal law of many States. The 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, for example, provides: "No Contracting State shall
expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened ... ,,97 A similar norm is embodied in the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment:
"No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."98
Neither the Convention Against Torture nor the Refugee
Convention explicitly states that the duty of non-refoulement entails the
duty not to reject asylum-seekers at a State's borders. Nor do these
Conventions explicitly limit the scope of the duty of non-refoulement to
refugees already present in the territory of the State of asylum.99
Scholars have argued convincingly that at the time of drafting, States
intended the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention to be
96. My discussion here draws on my previous work on the status of the principle of
non-refoulement in international law. See Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum
in International Law, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 16-31 (1994).
97. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33(1), 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 176 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
98. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3(1), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114 [hereinafter Convention
Against Torture]. Other instruments that prohibit refoulement include: OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art. 11(3),
1001 U.N.T.S. 46, 48 [hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention]; Principles Concerning
Treatment of Refugees, 1966, art. 111(3), reprinted in UNHCR, COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES 201, 203 (1990); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22(8), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, reprinted in 9
I. L. M. 673 (1970).
While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not contain a
specific non-refoulement provision, its article 7 prohibits torture. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The U.N. Human Rights Committee said
that pursuant to that prohibition, States parties "must not expose individuals to the
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to
another country by way of their extradition, expulsion, or refoulement." General Comment
20, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, para. 9, U.N. Doc.A/47/40
(1992), Apr. 3, 1992 [hereinafter General Comment 20].
99. See Refugee Convention, supra note 97, arts. 31-32, 189 U.N.T.S. at 175. In
contrast, articles 31 and 32 explicitly limit their application to refugees present in the
territory of the asylum State. See id.
20
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applicable only to refugees already present in the asylum State. 100 Since
1951, however, the UNHCR and many academic commentators have
asserted that the duty of non-refoulement applies at a State's borders as
well as within them.10 1 Christian Tomuschat, for example, makes a
cogent argument based on the purposes of the Convention Against
Torture that its non-refoulement provision prohibits States from
rejecting asylum-seekers at their borders:
Since the paramount objective is protection from torture, one
will have to conclude here that refoulement is to be interpreted
in a broad sense as comprehending any form of State action,
including rejection at the border. Article 3 [of the Convention
Against Torture] proceeds from the assumption that
governmental authorities surrendering a person to the
authorities of another State that habitually practices torture
would themselves become accomplices of the crime of torture. In
that perspective, the subtle legal distinction between returning
someone who has already put his foot on the territory of the
desired host State, and preventing another person from
performing that symbolic act becomes immaterial. 102
In addition to interpreting non-refoulement provisions in treaties as 3s
encompassing non-rejection at the border, academic commentators have
made the claim that such an interpretation has attained the status of
international customary law.10 3 The UNHCR, reflecting the views held
100. See GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (2d ed.
1996) ("States were not prepared to include in the [Refugee] Convention any article on
admission of refugees; non-refoulement in the sense of even a limited obligation to allow
entry may well have been seen as coming too close to the unwished-for duty to grant
asylum."); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 40 (1980) ("Article 33 only
prohibits the expulsion or return (refoulement) of refugees where they are likely to suffer
persecution; it does not obligate the Contracting State to admit any person who has not
already set foot in its territory ...."). Weiss's commentary on the travaux preparatoires of
the Refugee Convention, however, indicates that article 33's use of the words "in any
manner whatsoever" "would seem to indicate" that the Convention's non-refoulement
provision "applied to non-admittance at the frontier." THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951:
THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES ANALYSED, WITH A COMMENTARY BY THE LATE DR. PAUL
WEISS 341 (1995).
101. Both the UNHCR and scholars denounced the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that
article 33 of the Refugee Convention does not reach asylum-seekers who have not yet
arrived in the territory of the asylum State in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S.
155, 180-83 (1993). See UNHCR, The Haitian Refoulement Case 1993 Brief Amicus
Curiae, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 85 (1994) [hereinafter UNHCR Amicus Briel]; GOODWIN-
GILL, supra note 100, at 143; Development, US Supreme Court Takes Aim at
International Law-Again, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 461 (1993); Elwin Griffith, Problems of
Interpretation in Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Proceedings under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 255, 270-81 (1996).
102. Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 257, 259
(1992) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 196 ('The principle of non-
refoulement has developed to include non-rejection at the frontier, thus promoting
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by the large number of States making up its Executive Committee (and
thus bearing upon the customary international law claim), maintains
that position as well. 104 The Executive Committee of the UNHCR has on
several occasions addressed the issue of rejection at the frontier as a
form of refoulement in its authoritative statements.10 5 In 1977, for
example, it asserted "the fundamental importance of the observance of
the principle of non-refoulement-both at the border and within the
territory of a State of persons who may be subjected to persecution if
returned to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they
have been formally recognized as refugees."
10 6
admission...."); David A. Martin, Refugees and Migration, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL
ORDER 391, 411 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) ("[I]n light of state
practice since 1951, a strong case can be made that non-refoulement now includes non-
rejection at the frontiers, and further, that non-refoulement of refugees has crystallized as
a rule of customary international law binding on all states.").
104. See, e.g., UNHCR Amicus Brief, supra note 101, at 94-97.
105. On the status of the Conclusions in international law, see generally Sztucki,
supra note 104. For a description of the authority and function of the Executive
Committee, see GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 215. The Executive Committee had 50
States as members at its last session, in October 1998. See Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner's Programme, Forty-Ninth Session, Provisional List of Participants,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/907 (1998), available at <www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/excom/reports/
907.html>.
106. UNHCR Executive Comm., Executive Committee Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII)-
1977-Non-Refoulement, para. c (visited Dec. 2, 1999) <www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/
excom/xconc/excom6.htm> (emphases added). In his analysis of the Conclusions of the
Executive Committee, Sztucki identified the 1977 statement as an example of an
interpretative statement having regulatory or normative content, rather than a provision
on progressive development of the law. See Jerzy Sztucki, The Conclusions on the
International Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR
Programme, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 285, 300 (1989). See also UNHCR, Note on
International Protection, Executive Comm. 49th Sess., para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/898
(1998) (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <www.unhcr.ch/refworldlunhcr/excom/reports/898e.htm>
("The right to seek asylum requires that persons fleeing persecution or danger be
admitted, at least on a temporary basis, somewhere. One essential component of the
institution of asylum is the principle of non-refoulement .... Refoulement can take a
number of forms, including non-admission at the frontier and interdiction at sea.")
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1998 Note]; UNHCR Executive Comm., Executive
Committee Conclusion No. 22 (XXXJI)-1981-Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of
Large-Scale Influx, para. II.A.2 (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/'
excom/xconc/excom22.htm> ("In all cases the fundamental principle of non-refoulement
including non-rejection at the frontier must be scrupulously observed.") (emphasis added)
[hereinafter EXCOM Conclusion No. 22].
The view that rejection at the frontier is prohibited under the general rubric of the
principle of non-refoulement is also supported by several regional instruments and
declarations. For example, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa contains an express duty of non-rejection from frontiers for its
States parties. See OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 98, art. 11(3). This duty applies
with respect to any person falling within its generous "refugee" definition, see id. art. I,
who, if rejected, would be compelled to "return to or remain in a territory where his life,
physical integrity or liberty would be threatened," id. art. 11(3). Similarly, the non-binding
Latin American Cartagena Declaration on Refugees adopted in 1984 states that the
principle of non-refoulement includes the prohibition of rejection at the frontier: Article 5
"reiterate[s] the importance and meaning of the principle of non-refoulement (including
the prohibition of rejection at the frontier) as a corner-stone of the international protection
22
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The Committee has applied that conception of non-refoulement to 40
closure of borders, indicating that border closures that prevent asylum-
seekers from finding safety may amount to refoulement in breach of
international law.107 Indeed, this could hardly be otherwise. If the
principle of non-refoulement prohibits rejection at the border, then the
principle must prohibit closure of the border as well. This is because the
effect of either act on the asylum-seeker is the same. In both instances
the target asylum State's act denies the asylum-seeker admission to
safety from persecution. State practice with respect to the duty of non-
refoulement, including non-rejection at the frontier and non-closure of
borders, is not absolutely uniform, but border closures and like
measures seem to be the exception rather than the norm. 108 While
of refugees. Full text of the Declaration is available at <www.unhcr.cbrefworld/legal/
instrume/asylum/cart eng.htm>.
The prohibition of rejection at the frontier is also contained in the Principles
Concerning Treatment of Refugees adopted by the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee. See Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees, supra note 109, art. 111(3).
Finally, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated in a 1984
recommendation:
[B]earing in mind the prohibition of torture found in article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, States should ensure that the principle
according to which no person should be subjected to refusal of
admission at the frontier, rejection... or any other measure which
would have the result of compelling him to return to, or remain in, a
territory where he has a well-founded fear of persecution ... shall be
applied regardless of whether this person has been recognised as a
refugee under the [Refugee Convention].
Recommendation No. R (84) 1 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe on Jan. 25, 1984 (emphasis added); see also Council of Europe Resolution 14
(1967) on Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution, reprinted in UNHCR, supra note
98, at 305 (providing in art. 2 that "no one shall be subjected to refusal of admission at the
frontier, rejection.., or any other measure which would have the result of compelling him
to return to, or remain in, a territory where he would be in danger of persecution")
(emphasis added).
107. See UNHCR, Note on International Protection, Executive Comm., 48th Sess. pt.
II, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/882 (1997) (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <www.unhcr.chlrefworld/unhcr/
notes/882.htm> [hereinafter 1997 Note].
108. In its annual Note on International Protection presented to the Executive
Committee, the UNHCR has generally noted that most States abide by their obligations
to offer refuge to asylum-seekers. See, e.g., 1997 Note, supra note 107; 1998 Note, supra
note 106. Goodwin-Gill in this regard observed:
Over the last forty-five or so years, the broader interpretation of non-
refoulement has established itself. States have allowed large numbers
of asylum seekers not only to cross their frontiers, for example, in
Africa, Europe and South East Asia, but also to remain pending a
solution.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 123.
That, of course, is not to minimize the instances of State non-compliance with the
principle of non-refoulement that unfortunately do occur. See, e.g., 1997 Note, supra note
107, at 2 ('The past year has seen numerous incidents of refoulement, and serious abuses
of refugee rights. Refugees and asylum-seekers have been expelled, in some cases even
after their acceptance for resettlement in third countries, rejected at borders, interdicted
on the high seas and otherwise involuntarily returned, whether through armed force or
pursuant to bilateral agreements between States. As a result, refugees and asylum-
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individual refugee status determination may not be practicable in a
situation of a sudden large-scale influx of asylum-seekers, nothing in
international refugee law, as the UNHCR and the States members of its
Executive Committee see it, divests the target asylum State of its non-
refoulement duty in such a situation. The Executive Committee has
expressly addressed this point in one of its Conclusions:
1. in situations of large-scale influx, asylum seekers should be
admitted to the State in which they first seek refuge and if
that State is unable to admit them on a durable basis, it
should always admit them at least on a temporary basis and
provide them with protection according to the principles set
out below.
2. in all cases the fundamental principle of non-refoulement
including non-rejection at the frontier must be scrupulously
observed.109
41 Commentators caution, however, that some distinction must be
drawn between cases of mass influx of asylum-seekers and cases of
individual arrivals. 110  While States have at times voiced their
reservation to the applicability of the non-refoulement principle in cases
of mass influx,111 State practice in respect of people fleeing the very
seekers have been exposed to grave, and in some cases life-threatening, danger."). See
supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting border closure instances).
109. EXCOM Conclusion No. 22, supra note 106, pt. II(A).
110. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 133; Kay Hailbronner, Non-
Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful
Legal Thinking?, in THE NEW ASYLUM-SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s, at 123, 128
(David A. Martin ed., 1988).
111. For example, the non-binding 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides a
mass-influx exception to the recognition of a general duty of States not to reject asylum-
seekers at the frontiers. See Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 3(2), G.A. Res. 2312
(XXII) (1967), reprinted in UNHCR, supra note 98, at 57. The Declaration specifically
provides:
1. No person referred to in article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected
to measures such as rejection at the frontier ....
2. Exception may be made to the foregoing principle only for
overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard
the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons.
3. Should a State decide in any case that exception to the principle
stated in paragraph 1 of this article would be justified, it shall
consider the possibility of granting to the person concerned,
under such conditions as it may deem appropriate, an
opportunity, whether by way of provisional asylum or otherwise,
of going to another State.
Id. art. 3.
This indicates that in 1967 States considered mass influx to present an exceptional
situation that may fall outside the prohibition of rejection. Yet even in that exceptional
circumstance, the States recognized that solutions other than rejection were to be
24
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recent conflict in Kosovo confirms that States generally do not refuse to
provide refuge from a genuine humanitarian crisis despite the fact that
asylum-seekers present themselves at their borders en masse.112
It may thus be correct to conclude, as does Goodwin-Gill, that the 42
principle of non-refoulement secures admission with a presumption that
some local durable solution, such as asylum, will follow, but that this is
so only in the case of individual arrivals, not in cases of mass influx.113
Non-refoulement as a principle of non-rejection, however, applies
equally to cases of mass influx and individual cases. 114 It is only what
happens with the asylum-seekers after their admission into the State of
refuge that may differ based on the fact that they were part of a mass-
influx. In the following necessity analysis, I will therefore consider that
international law proscribes refoulement, including rejection at the
frontier and closure of borders, irrespective of the fact that the asylum
State is faced with a large-scale influx of asylum-seekers.
B. Draft Article 33 as a Defense to Border Closure
Given that border closure in the face of an influx of asylum-seekers 43
would amount to refoulement in breach of the duty of States not to
return or expose people to persecution, the question is whether a State
could properly invoke necessity to excuse its breach under the ILC's
draft article 33. As laid out above, the answer depends on whether the
influx jeopardizes an "essential interest" of the State, places it in "grave
and imminent peril," the State has no other means available to it to
protect its essential interest, and the balance of interests tips in favor of
the State's asserted interest." 5 Even if all four elements are
established, the State's claim will nonetheless fail if the case falls
within one of draft article 33's three exceptions. I address each of these
elements in turn.
considered. See id. art. 3(3). Helton observed that article 3 of the Declaration evinces "a
governmental concern with potential threats to stability as well as an awareness of the
need for a pragmatic approach which addresses the protection needs of individual asylum
seekers." Arthur C. Helton, Legal Dimensions of Responses to Complex Humanitarian
Emergencies, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 533, 536 (1998).
112. As of April 19, 1999, a total of 603,300 persons fleeing the conflict in Kosovo
sought and received protection in neighboring States, including 365,000 in Albania,
132,500 in Macedonia, and 32,300 in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Updated information is
available at <www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm>. It should also be noted that the
vast majority of these people flooded into the neighboring States in a span of a few weeks,
certainly suddenly and en masse.
113. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 202.
114. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (quoting an UNHCR Executive
Conclusion on this point).
115. See supra Part III.
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1. Essential Interest
44 The threshold question in necessity analysis is whether the State
engaged in internationally unlawful conduct in order to safeguard an
essential interest. 116 Contemporary international law does not require
that the interest in question go to the very existence of the State.
Rather, as Ago has pointed out, it suffices that the interest relate to
such essential matters as, among others, "the continued function of its
essential services, the maintenance of internal peace .... [and] the
preservation of the environment of its territory or a part thereof."
117
Clearly, a sudden large-scale influx of asylum-seekers into the territory
of a State impacts- significant interests.
45 Firstly, the maintenance of internal order in a host State may be
put in jeopardy by a mass influx of asylum-seekers. In many countries,
the arrival of asylum-seekers has the potential to upset delicate ethnic
or political balances. 118 The arrival, for example, of a large number of
people of an ethnicity that represents a minority in the asylum State
has the potential to disturb a fragile ethnic, social, or political
balance.1 19 Sudden increases in the size of the minority could fuel a
desire for increased autonomy or political power that, in turn, could
destabilize the asylum State. 120 A State's ability to maintain internal
stability is critical if the State is to provide its people with the security
and services that are its raison-de-etre.
46 Additionally, in terms of essential services, reception of a large
number of people into a State may place substantial burdens on the
administrative structure as authorities attempt to register arriving
individuals and provide for their immediate needs. Food and shelter
may need to be provided quickly, medical and social care may need to be
offered, and personal security and sanitation needs to be ensured. For
many countries that are potential hosts of a large number of asylum-
seekers arriving en masse, the burden of coping with such an influx may
strain the public services sector, threatening the welfare of the State's
116. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(1)(a).
117. See Ago Report, supra note 18, para. 2.
118. See, e.g., Bushinsky, supra note 4, at 4. In two instances, similar concerns have
been voiced with respect to ethnic Albanians arriving in Macedonia, which has a
substantial Albanian minority. In 1997, internal unrest in Albania threatened to send
large numbers of Albanians into Macedonia. See, e.g., Straus & Fox, supra note 4. Even
more recently, many Albanians from Kosovo looked to Albania for refuge during the
NATO bombings of Serbia. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, West's Strategy: Halt Kosovo War
with Neither Side Victorious, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 24, 1999, at 6 (reciting NATO
fears that "the flood of guns and refugees across Kosovo's borders will ignite ethnic
Albanian populations in neighboring Macedonia").
119. See, e.g., Amitav Acharya & David B. Dewitt, Fiscal Burden Sharing, in
RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 111, 120, 123 (James C. Hathaway ed.,
1997) ("[R]efugees aggravate countries of first asylum, challenging their capacities to
ensure social cohesion and economic and political management in the face of such
intrusion.").
120. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
26




The local environment of the host State may also be significantly 47
impacted by the sudden presence of large numbers of people, as trees
are used for firewood, fields and meadows for camping, and rivers for
washing and sewage disposal. The UNHCR highlighted the potentially
significant impact of a mass refugee presence on the environment of the
host State in the following account:
When hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees flooded into
[Virunga National Park, Africa's oldest game sanctuary] in
1994, an ecological disaster of grand proportions appeared
imminent. The gorillas came under threat from local gunmen,
poachers and refugees. Long columns of men, women and
children began to hack out hundreds of tons of rare woods daily
to heat their cooking pots. Within two years they had cut down
millions of trees covering more than 113 square kilometers of
virgin forest.
The picture was similar in Tanzania where as many as
600,000 refugees from Rwanda and Burundi were housed in the
Kagera region in the northwest of the country. They consumed
more than 1,200 tons of firewood each day; more than 570
square kilometers of forest were affected.1
22
As the foregoing illustrates, a sudden large-scale influx of asylum- 48
seekers has a strong potential for impacting significant interests of the
host State. In practice, the determination of whether a State's
threatened interest is essential depends on the specific circumstances of
121. In 1995, the Office of the UNHCR observed that "[m]any low-income developing
countries whose resources are already strained face destabilizing social and economic
effects from a sudden, mass influx of refugees." UNHCR, Note on International Protection:
International Protection in Mass Influx, para. 18, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/850 (Sept. 1, 1995)
<www.unhcr.chlrefworld/unhcr/excom/reports/850.htm>. The Note cautioned that "the
security implications of mass flows for host States must be acknowledged," id. at para. 15,
and observed that mass influx of asylum-seekers in particular affect "security, water,
sanitation, the environment, health, and law enforcement," id. Acharya and Dewitt also
noted the impact of a mass influx of people into a country:
Migration impacts upon the carrying capacities of the local
environments, the management of resource extraction and
consumption, the reallocation of scarce commodities, the regulation of
labour, land, and capital, the relations between host and transient
populations, and the stability of the governing regime, and therefore
upon the security interests of individuals, of communities, of
institutions, of countries, and of regions. In the most profound sense,
refugees-as a specific subset of migration-challenge both the notion
of 'human security' as well as the broader and more traditionally
understood concepts of common, comprehensive, and cooperative
security.
Acharya & Dewitt, supra note 119, at 123 (internal citations omitted).
122. Craig Sanders, Where Have All the Pretty Flowers Gone ... and the Trees... and
the Gorillas?, REFUGEES, Winter 1997, at 26, 28.
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the case. 123 When the circumstances are such that the mass influx
threatens the host State's ability to maintain a stable and secure
environment for its population, the influx could well be deemed to
threaten the essential interests of the State.
2. Grave and Imminent Peril
49 The next step in the necessity analysis is to determine whether the
threat to the State's essential interest rises to the level of a grave and
imminent peril. 124 Ago and the ILC adopt the Grotian view that the
peril to the State's essential interest must be extremely grave, without,
however, offering a measure of the gravity of the peril. 125 I would
suggest that any threat likely to destroy the possibility of realizing an
essential State interest constitutes "grave peril." Returning to the
situation of mass influx, if the influx threatens to render it impossible
for the State to maintain a secure and stable environment, it should be
considered grave.
50 As for the imminency of the peril, the ICJ in the Gabdikovo-
Nagymaros decision expressed the understanding that imminence "goes
far beyond the concept of 'possibility."' 126 The inquiry is into the
immediacy or proximity of the peril. 127 This requirement would seem
easily satisfied in a situation where, for example, a mass-influx of
asylum-seekers is already underway or is soon to take place, there
being little possibility that it would stop short of entering the target
asylum State were it not for the border closure.
51 Like the "essential interest" inquiry, the determination of the
gravity and imminence of the peril is fact-specific, and must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. As a general matter, however, a
large-scale influx of asylum-seekers could well threaten a grave and
imminent peril to an essential interest of the target asylum State.
3. No Alternative
52 Even if a mass influx places a State in grave and imminent peril by
threatening an essential interest, a necessity claim will nonetheless fail
unless the State had no lawful alternative available to protect the
essential interest. 28 The ILC's Commentary makes clear that a State
bears a substantial burden in making the claim that it had "no
alternative": "[T]he peril must not have been escapable by any other
means, even a more costly one, that could be adopted in compliance
123. See supra text accompanying note 74.
124. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(l)(a).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
126. Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, para. 54.
127. See id.
128. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(1)(a).
28
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol3/iss1/1
State of Necessity
with international obligations." 129 The ICJ relied on this understanding
in the Gabfikovo-Nagymaros case. 130
To be sure, border closure is a drastic way to defend against a 5
threat posed to a State by a mass influx of asylum-seekers. Certainly,
there are situations in which a State would have other means of dealing
with such a threat. For example, if the perceived threat is
destabilization, the State could set up camps for the asylum-seekers
away from large population centers where the new arrivals could
exacerbate internal tensions. The asylum State could also seek the
assistance of the international community in providing the necessary
care and materials for the asylum-seekers and in securing durable
solutions, such as resettlement in third States.
Even as I acknowledge the possibility of alternatives to border 54
closure, it cannot be excluded out of hand that there could be situations
when the closing of borders may be the only means available to a State
to safeguard an essential interest. In light of the ICJ's view that the
additional cost of alternatives is not a determinative factor in
evaluating whether the unlawful conduct was the only means open to
the State to protect its interests, 13' it will be a rare situation when
border closure would be sanctioned as a permissible response to a large-
scale influx of asylum-seekers. Notwithstanding, at least thus far in the
analysis of draft article 33 as applied to the case of a mass influx,
nothing per se precludes a valid claim of necessity in defense of border
closure.
4. Balancing of Interests
Finally, draft article 33 requires a balancing of the interest of the
State that closed its borders in violation of its international obligations,
against the harm done by this breach to the interest of the State to
which the obligation had been owed. A plea of necessity can succeed
only if the former outweighs the latter. 132 Nonetheless, while it is
relatively easy to identify the interest of the target asylum State,1 33 the
interest to be placed on the other side of the scales eludes clear
identification.
The principle of non-refoulement, including the prohibition against 56
rejection from the frontiers and border closures, is part of international
conventional and customary law.134 If the State that closes its borders
to an influx of asylum-seekers is a party to a treaty that prohibits
refoulement, such as the Refugee Convention 135 or the Convention
129. Commentary, supra note 42, para. 33.
130. Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, paras. 55-57.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Subsection IV(B)(1).
134. See supra Section IV(A).
135. See Refugee Convention, supra note 97, art. 33.
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Against Torture,1a6 the State would be in breach of its international
obligation under the treaty with respect to all other States parties. 137
All parties to a human rights treaty have an interest in seeing that the
rights provided therein are respected, and the parties are entitled to
pursue remedies against the violating State, whether or not they suffer
an injury as a result of the breach. 138 Thus, in the treaty context, the
interest to be weighed in the necessity analysis against the target
asylum State's interest is the interest of the other States parties in
ensuring that the duty of non-refoulement is not violated.
57 Ascertaining the competing interest is more complicated if the
accusation against the target-asylum State is based on customary
international law. If the duty of non-refoulement were deemed among
the obligations erga omnes of international law, then refoulement
through border closure would engage the interests of all States.13 9 The
ICJ, in frequently-cited dictum of the Barcelona Traction Case,
discussed the nature of obligations erga omnes, stating that they derive:
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also
from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection
136. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 98, art. 3.
137. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States makes clear
that, "[]ike international agreements generally, international human rights agreements
create legal obligations between the states parties, although the agreements are for the
benefit of individuals .. " RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, § 701 cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also SCHACHTER,
supra note 77, at 209-10 ("In a multilateral treaty the obligations as a rule run to all
parties ... ").
138. Section 703(1) of the Restatement in this respect provides: "A state party to an
international human rights agreement has, as against any other state party violating the
agreement, the remedies generally available for violation of an international agreement,
as well as any remedies provided by the agreement." RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, §
703(1). The Restatement explains "[u]nless the human rights agreement provides or
clearly implies otherwise, the ordinary remedies are available to any state party against a
state party violating the agreement, even if the violation did not affect nationals of the
claimant state or any other particular interest of that state." Id. § 703(1) cmt. a; see also
SCHACHTER, supra note 77, at 209-10.
139. Annacker identified an erga omnes obligation as one having a "non-
bilateralizable structure." Claudia Annacker, The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law, 46 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. INT'L L. 131, 136 (1994). That is to
say, an erga omnes obligation "can only be fulfilled or breached vis-a-vis all States
belonging to a community... of States which are bound by a norm of treaty or customary
international law .... Id. Clearly, human rights obligations have this character. If a
State breaches human rights protected by custom, that State breaches its implied promise
to protect those rights vis-a-vis all the other States that are similarly bound. The injury
resulting from the breach thus reaches all States in the community. See LAURI
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (1988)
(identifying basic human rights obligations as ones owed to the community of States); see
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, para. 702, cmt. o (1987) (noting that violations of
certain customary human rights obligations "are violations of obligations to all other
states ... ").
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have entered into the body of general international law ....
[O]thers are conferred by international instruments of a
universal or quasi-universal character. 140
The duty of non-refoulement is not among the obligations in the
Barcelona Traction dictum. Similarly, the Restatement does not include
refoulement in its enumeration of acts that constitute violations of erga
omnes obligations in international customary law. 141 The Restatement
does, however, recognize the prohibition of torture as a customary, erga
omnes obligation of States. 142 Accordingly, if it is fairly certain that
refoulement through border closure will lead to torture, an argument
could be made that the target asylum State breached its erga omnes
obligation to prevent repeated or notorious acts of torture. 143 The same
could be said for any of the other acts recognized as prohibited in
customary law and carrying an erga omnes obligation, such as genocide.
In such cases, like those in which conventional prohibitions of
refoulement are applicable, all States would have a legal interest in
ensuring the observation of the duty of non-refoulement. The balancing
test of the necessity analysis, thus, would involve the interest of the
target-asylum State in closing its borders against the interest of any
given State in securing respect for the customary norm prohibiting
torture.
The interest of other States with respect to maintaining the 59
prohibition of refoulement outside the treaty context is, as we saw, not
easy to establish. But even where it can be shown, such as between the
States parties to a convention that has a non-refoulement provision, the
individualized interest of those States will seem inferior to the interest
of the target asylum State. This is because the target asylum State acts
in order to protect an essential interest of the State from grave and
imminent peril, whereas another State can only place on the scales of
the balancing test an interest in seeing that a treaty or a customary
erga omnes human rights obligation is honored. Applying the draft
article 33 balancing test to determine whether a state of necessity may
be invoked in justification of a breach of an international obligation,
thus, in effect, requires a calculus between two States, one facing an
imminent harm to an essential interest and the other facing no direct
140. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 3,
para. 34 (Feb. 5).
141. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 702 (deeming the prohibition of certain
human rights violations customary international law); id at § 702 cmt. o ("Violations of
the rules stated in this section are violations of obligations to all other states and any
state may invoke the ordinary remedies available to a state when its rights under
customary law are violated."). On the other hand, the Restatement expressly notes that its
list of human rights recognized in customary law "is not necessarily complete, and is not
closed ...." Id. § 702 cmt. a.
142. See id. § 702(d).
143. Or to another of the acts indubitably recognized as prohibited in customary law
and carrying an erga omnes obligation. See id. § 702 (listing such acts).
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injury from the breach. Surely, the target asylum State's clear interest
would tip the scale in favor of applying necessity.
60 It may thus be posited that the closure of borders to stem an influx
of asylum-seekers, while presumably a wrongful act on the
international plane, is an act that, under the provisionally adopted ILC
draft article 33, could be justified on grounds of necessity. I will discuss
below what consequences may flow from such justification, but first it
needs to be explored whether one of the exceptions to the application of
the necessity excuse could apply to the case of border closure.
C. Exceptions to the Application of Necessity
61 Even if all the preconditions for relying on necessity to excuse an
internationally unlawful act are satisfied, a State cannot prevail on its
necessity claim if one of the three exceptions of draft article 33
applies. 14 4 That is, if: (1) the relevant obligation arises from a
peremptory norm of international law; (2) the act in question violates a
treaty provision that excludes necessity as an excuse of breach; or (3)
the State invoking the defense contributed to the state of necessity.
145
1. Peremptory Norm
62 Under draft article 33, a state of necessity may not be invoked "if
the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international
law."146 The ILC's Commentary explains that "peremptory norm" refers
to jus cogens, that is "norms accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as norms from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by subsequent
norms of general international law having the same character." 147 The
ILC did not provide a list of international norms of peremptory
character beyond noting, as possessed of such character, the prohibition
on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, genocide, and the killing of prisoners of
144. See Ago Report, supra note 18, paras. 16-17; Commentary, supra note 42, para.
37.
145. See ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(2); supra text accompanying note 67
(setting out ILC Draft Article 33(2)).
146. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(2)(a).
147. Commentary, supra note 42, para. 37. According to the ILC, the rationale for
precluding reliance on a state of necessity in the case of breach of peremptory rules is that
peremptory rules are so essential for the life of the international
community as to make it all the more inconceivable that a State
should be entitled to decide unilaterally, however acute the state of
necessity which overtakes it, that it may commit a breach of the
obligations which these rules impose on it.
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war. 148
It is apparent that the ILC envisions a rather high threshold for a
norm of international law to be considered "peremptory" for the
purposes of article 33. This is illustrated, for example, by the ILC's
explanation of the prohibition of the use of force against another State.
The ILC draws a distinction between, on the one hand, "acts of
aggression, conquest and forcible annexation,"'149 and, on the other,
lesser forcible acts that, "although infringing the territorial sovereignty
of a State, need not necessarily be considered as act[s] of aggression, or
not, in any case, as breach[es] of an international obligation of jus
cogens."'150 The latter acts may include the rescue of nationals and other
limited forcible actions undertaken to eliminate a source of a threat to
the State.151 Although such acts violate the prohibition on the use of
force against the territorial integrity of a State, they do not amount to a
breach of a jus cogens norm and, consequently, they may be excused by
the plea of necessity.152
Because of this high threshold, it is unlikely that the customary 64
prohibition of refoulement could be considered to be on the level of a
peremptory norm in the view of the ILC. While non-refoulement has
been said to be a peremptory norm, 53 this does not mean that it has
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at para. 23. See Schachter, supra note 77, at 227-28; see also HANNIKAINEN,
supra note 139, at 337 (distinguishing between the threat or use of force with an
aggressive purpose and use of force without such intent and noting that only aggressive
force falls into the sphere of jus cogens).
151. The ILC specifically referred to the following actions:
incursions into foreign territory to forestall harmful operations by an
armed group which was preparing to attack the territory of the State,
or [those] in pursuit of an armed band or gang of criminals who had
crossed the frontier and perhaps had their base in that foreign
territory, or [actions] to protect the lives of nationals or other persons
attacked or detained by hostile forces or groups not under the
authority and control of the State, or to eliminate or neutralize a
source of troubles which threatened to occur or to spread across the
frontier.
Commentary, supra note 42, para. 23. For an application of the plea of necessity to the
situation of rescue of nationals in foreign territory, see, for example, Jean Raby, The State
of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals, 1988 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253.
152. See Schachter, supra note 77, at 228.
153. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 202; Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon,
Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
411, 435-36 (1989) (arguing that the prohibition against refoulement is a jus cogens
norm). Goodwin-Gill, however, recognizes that although the principle of non-refoulement
is well-established in international law, it is not an absolute principle but rather one that
allows exceptions for national security and public order reasons. See GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 100, at 139-41. These exceptions may be particularly relevant in the case of a
mass influx of asylum-seekers. Goodwin-Gill in this regard wrote:
It can be argued that a mass influx is not itself sufficient to justify
refoulement, given the likelihood of an international response to offset
any potential threat to national security.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the prospect of a massive
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risen to that level under the ILC's construction of the term. Indeed, it is
hard to see why non-refoulement should be considered to be a
peremptory norm for the purposes of necessity, while internationally
unlawful, albeit limited, use of force against another State is not so
considered. It is thus unlikely that the peremptory norm exception to
the application of necessity could disable reliance on necessity to excuse
border closure.
2. Treaty Provision
65 The second exception to the application of necessity arises when a
treaty provision "explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of
invoking the state of necessity with respect to [the breached]
obligation."154 When a treaty contains a specific non-derogation
provision, for example, it is clear that the drafters intended to preclude
the availability of the necessity excuse for breach of the obligations
enumerated in the provision. Thus, while article 4(1) of the ICCPR
permits limited derogation from obligations assumed in the Covenant
under extraordinary circumstances, 15 5 article 4(2) explicitly proscribes
derogation from certain enumerated obligations, including the article 7
prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The
non-derogation provision thus rules out reliance on necessity as a
justification for breach of article 7's prohibition of torture. 156
66 Whether border closures constitute a violation of the ICCPR's
prohibition of torture, however, is an open question. In support of such
a conclusion, General Comment 20 of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee notes that States parties "must not expose individuals to the
influx of refugees and asylum-seekers exposes the limits of the State's
obligation otherwise not to return or refuse admission to refugees.
Id. at 141. Other commentators criticize the view that holds out non-refoulement as a
peremptory norm. See, e.g., Hailbronner, supra note 110, at 129-32.
154. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(2)(b).
155. ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 4(1) ("In time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed .. "). Note,
however, that Article 4(1) permits derogations only to the extent that they would not be
inconsistent with the States parties' other obligations under international law. See id. See
generally MANFRED NOwAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 72-93 (1993) (discussing the scope of article 4); ANNA-LENA SVENSON-
MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION 380-
450 (1998) (same).
156. See Ago Report, supra note 18, at 46 n.150 (noting that "necessity is ruled out as
a ground for non-compliance" with respect to the non-derogable obligations under the
ICCPR); The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. 58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4
(1984), at Annex (listing freedom from torture among ICCPR rights "not derogable under
any conditions even for the asserted purpose of preserving the life of the nation");
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 218
(1989) ("The language of the Covenant prohibits any derogation not explicitly permitted
by Article 4, thus excluding invocation of the customary law exception of state of
necessity.").
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danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition,
expulsion or refoulement."15 7 Making that argument, however, requires
showing that the border closure amounted to refoulement and exposed
the asylum-seekers to torture.
It is even less clear that the Convention Against Torture precludes 67
the availability of the necessity justification to excuse a border closure.
Like the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture makes the right to be
free from torture non-derogable. 158 Yet, unlike the ICCPR, it also
contains a provision proscribing refoulement,15 9 to which no non-
derogation clause attaches. In another context, Ago concludes that "the
fact that necessity has been explicitly ruled out as a ground for
deviating from an obligation specially singled out must lead a contrario
to the conclusion that necessity can still be invoked when the
obligations called in question by the conduct of the State are other than
the one in respect of which it has been ruled out."160 To diffuse such an
argument, one might distinguish between general and specialized
treaties. Ago applied the above reasoning to derogability under the
ICCPR,161 a multifaceted human rights convention that prescribes non-
derogation in respect of only some of its provisions. The Convention
Against Torture, it might be argued, is distinguished in that it, in
essence, focuses on only a single right, the right to be free from torture.
As such, the preclusion of derogation from the obligation to prevent
torture may extend to the attendant prohibition of refoulement. Within
the wording of draft article 33, this might be said to reflect an instance
of a treaty provision that "implicitly excludes the possibility of
invoking the state of necessity with respect to [the breached]
obligation." 16 2 In any event, it is not obvious that the Convention
precludes an assertion of the state of necessity in defense of a violation
of the non-refoulement provision.
In the case of a treaty that attaches no explicit non-derogation 68
clause to any of its provisions, draft article 33's second exception is not
conclusively disabled. As the ILC has cautioned, "silence on the part of
the treaty should not be automatically construed as allowing the
possibility of invoking the state of necessity.163 Rather, the
determination of whether a treaty implicitly precludes reliance on the
state of necessity requires an inquiry into the object and purpose of the
157. General Comment 20, supra note 98, para. 9.
158. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 98, art. 2(2) ("No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.").
159. See id. art. 3(1). As discussed above, border closure may run afoul of this
provision. See supra text accompanying note 102.
160. Ago Report, supra note 18, at 46.
161. See id. at 46 n.150.
162. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(2)(b) (emphasis added).
163. See Commentary, supra note 42, para. 38.
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rule in question.164 Meron cautions, however, that the absence of a non-
derogation provision may well lead to the inference that the treaty
allows for the use of necessity as a justification for derogating from the
obligations it enshrines. 165
69 Significantly, the Refugee Convention is not merely silent about
non-derogation; it specifically provides that the principle of non-
refoulement is not absolute:
The benefit of the [non-refoulement] provision may not. . . be
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he
is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country. 166
70 Commentators have observed that '[n]ational security' and 'public
order,' for example, have long been recognized as potential justifications
for derogation" from the Convention's non-refoulement provision.
6 7
Given that the Refugee Convention explicitly allows for derogation from
the prohibition of refoulement in some circumstances and the fact that
the Convention does not include a non-derogation provision, it is
unlikely that it had as its object and purpose the elimination of reliance
on necessity with respect to the principle of non-refoulement.
71 In sum, none of the existing treaty provisions addressing or
relevant to non-refoulement is likely to prevent a State from defending
border closures on necessity grounds in the face of a mass influx of
asylum-seekers.
3. Contribution to the State of Necessity
72 The final exception to the application of necessity arises "if the
State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of
necessity."'' 6 The ILC explains that it "intended [the exception] to refer
to the case in which the State invoking the state of necessity has, in one
way or another, intentionally or by negligence, contributed to creating
the situation it wishes to invoke as justification for its non-fulfilment of
an international obligation."' 69 Whether this exception would apply to
an instance of border closure to avert a mass-influx of asylum-seekers is
fact-specific and cannot be answered in abstracto. Suffice it to say that
164. See id.
165. MERON, supra note 156, at 218-19.
166. Refugee Convention, supra note 97, art. 33(2); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 100, at 139 ("The Convention refugee definition is not an absolute guarantee of
protection, and non-refoulement is not an absolute principle.").
167. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 100, at 139.
168. ILC Draft Article, supra note 6, art. 33(2)(c).
169. Commentary, supra note 42, para. 41.
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it is not difficult to envision a situation falling within the exception. A
State, for example, might incite and promote a secession of a part of the
territory and population of a neighboring State. When the second
State's drive to suppress the secessionist movement sparks a mass flow
of people in the direction of the first State, the first State might close its
borders to the arriving asylum-seekers. In such a case, the first State
may well have contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity
and, if so, it could not rely on necessity to excuse its failure to adhere to
its non-refoulement obligation. On the other hand, it is equally
conceivable to imagine an asylum State that did not in any way
contribute to the state of necessity.
Given the foregoing analysis, there is a significant possibility that 73
none of the three exceptions that preclude a necessity defense would
apply to a particular border closure case.
D. Consequences of the Application of Necessity
It is thus apparent that, under certain circumstances, a State could 74
successfully invoke necessity in justification of its closure of borders to a
mass flow of asylum-seekers. The conditions for justifiable reliance on
necessity are stringent, but not impossible to satisfy. When a State can
show that the influx of asylum-seekers would threaten one or more of
its "essential interests," that the threat to the essential interest is
"grave and imminent," that it has "no alternative means" of
safeguarding the interest, that the "balance of interests" favors it, and
that none of the exceptions set out in draft article 33(2) applies, the
State may, according to draft article 33, close its borders to stem a mass
flow of people seeking asylum from persecution in its territory.
Though such an act directly breaches international obligations to
which many, if not all, States are bound, and exposes countless persons
to grave risks of persecution, the successful invocation of a state of
necessity precludes the wrongfulness of the internationally unlawful
act. In the view of the ILC, "the existence of a genuine state of
necessity ... has the effect of totally ridding the conduct of the acting
State of its wrongfulness .... "170
The necessity defense does not, however, necessarily preclude the 76
State "from being asked to make compensation for the injurious
consequences of its action .... ,171 Surveying international practice, Ago
170. Id. at para. 39.
171. Id.; see also Schwarzenberger, supra note 23, at 343 (noting that if the excuse of
necessity is valid, it excludes international responsibility, but as "it is a contrivance ofjus
aequum, it may involve a duty of compensation").
ILC Draft Article 35 adopted in 1996 provides that "[p]reclusion of wrongfulness of
an act of a state by virtue of the provisions of article... 33 does not prejudge any question
that may arise in regard to compensation for damage caused by that act." Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May-26 July
1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 125. reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 440 (1998). Note that the notion of
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notes examples where States exonerated from culpability on necessity
grounds for injuries caused by their unlawful actions were nevertheless
obliged to pay compensation for the consequences of their acts..17 2 In this
respect, the ICJ in the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Case noted that Hungary,
claiming necessity as an excuse for breach of its international treaty
obligations, "expressly acknowledged that, in any event, such a state of
necessity would not exempt it from its duty to compensate [the party
injured by its non-compliance with a treaty obligation].' 73
77 With regard to our present refoulement hypothetical case, two
categories of claimants may be eligible for compensation for injuries
resulting from a border closure excused on necessity grounds. First,
States faced with a larger influx of asylum-seekers as a result of
another State's border closure might seek compensation. 1 74 Second,
asylum-seekers who suffer injury as a result of the border closure might
also seek indemnification for their losses. Where large numbers of
persons suffer quantifiable losses, an international tribunal or
compensation commission might be established to award
compensation. 175
78 In reality, however, it may be excluded that a State would have to
compensation was present in the concept of necessity already in the time of Grotius. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility
and International Liability under International Law, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821,
833 (1996) (noting that the "absence of wrongfulness does not preclude the application of
some aspects of the secondary rules, which impose an obligation to compensate for the
suffered loss, damage or harm"). Sucharitkul observed that while State responsibility
arises from a breach of an international obligation of the State (which may be excused by
necessity), "[i]nternational liability arises out of injurious consequences which, according
to the natural law of causation, must result from activities over which the State has or
should have direct or indirect control or that lie within its jurisdiction." Id. at 835
(emphasis added). Sucharitkul argues that it is irrelevant for the purposes of determining
liability whether or not the State conduct that gave rise to the liability was
internationally wrongful (such as when justified by necessity). See id. at 833-35.
Writing in 1994, however, Tomuschat stated that "to date the notion of objective
liability, which does not require as one of its constitutive elements a breach of an
international obligation, has not yet been generally accepted in international law."
Christian Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Country of Origin, in THE PROBLEM OF
REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 59, 79 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996).
172. See Ago Report. supra note 18, at 26 (discussing Properties of Bulgarian
Minorities in Greece), 29-30 (discussing Company General of the Orinoco); see also BIN
CHENG, supra note 27, at 75 (referring to The Neptune case in this regard).
173. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 7, para. 48 (Sept. 5).
174. I wish to stress here that only States that actually suffer injury as a result of the
breach may properly seek compensation. Professor Dominic6 clearly made this point: "The
fact that all states are concerned by breach of multilateral obligations, and that they may
have a legal interest in those obligations being respected, in no way implies that they
should be treated as injured, if their own rights are not otherwise affected, since that
would create obvious confusion." Christian Dominic6, The International Responsibility of
States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 353, 362 (1999).
175. See, e.g., Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of
Asylum, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 532, 552 (1986) (noting that "there is no intrinsic reason why
the General Assembly cannot create a special body to collect, process and distribute
compensation funds due refugees worldwide, or assign this task to an existing body.").
[Vol. 3:1
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pay compensation for having prevented a large-scale influx of asylum-
seekers from entering its borders. Effective access to compensatory
regimes is foreclosed by the stark fact that, in the refugee arena, no
such regimes currently exist: there are neither burden-sharing
mechanisms for allocating responsibility for refugee protection among
States 176 nor cost-charging machinery to force refugee-producing States
to compensate States and individual victims of their unlawful actions.
From an empirical perspective, the countries of origin of asylum-
seekers, the so-called refugee-producing countries, are not asked to
compensate other States for the burden of caring for people whom they
caused to flee their homes. Likewise, asylum-seekers do not claim
compensation from their persecutors. 177 It could thus hardly be that
asylum-seekers prevented from entering a State by border closure-or
States that, as a result of border closure, receive more asylum-seekers-
would seek compensation from the State that closed its borders, a State
whose wrongful conduct, unlike that of the State of origin, is excused in
international law.
In sum, while compensation for an "excused" breach of international 80
law may be feasible in bilateral contexts involving discrete abuses-
such as in The Neptune or Torrey Canyon cases-it cannot be said to
exist for asylum-seekers who are prevented from entering a State by
border closure. Neither is compensation available to States who, as a
result of the border closure, receive more asylum-seekers. Accordingly,
the consequence of successfully invoking necessity in justification for
breaching the duty of non-refoulement through border closure is that
both the closure and resulting refoulement are deemed to be "not
wrongfur' and no compensation is paid for any consequent injuries,
damages, or liabilities.
176. See, e.g., Hathaway & Neve, supra note 4, at 117 ("[N]either the actual duty to
admit refugees nor the real costs associated with their arrival are fairly apportioned
among governments. There is a keen awareness that the states in which refugees arrive
presently bear sole legal responsibility for what often amounts to indefinite protection.");
id. at 187 ("The present, loosely constructed system of international cooperation in
refugee protection is characterized by vague promises of solidarity among governments,
accompanied by often undependable funding."). Hathaway & Neve propose a burden-
sharing mechanism for refugee care. See id. at 143-51, 187-209; see also Boed, supra note
96, at 32-33 (urging that a global burden-sharing mechanism be devised and
implemented). For a critique of the Hathaway & Neve proposal, see Deborah Anker,
Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, 11 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 295
(1998).
177. For an analysis of the responsibility of the country of origin to compensate
refugees and countries of asylum, see Lee, supra note 175. For an analysis applying the
law of State responsibility to asylum-seeker producing States, see Chaloka Beyani, State
Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of Forced Population Displacements in
International Law, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 130 (1995).
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V. CONCLUSION: A REFLECTION ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE ILC DRAFT
ARTICLE 33 BALANCING TEST
How is this result possible? Why is it that the doctrine of necessity
allows a State to close its borders to asylum-seekers arriving en masse,
apparently in breach of its duty of non-refoulement, with no adverse
consequences for that State? The crux of the problem lies in the
balancing test set out in article 33 of the ILC Draft Articles of State
Responsibility because it does not take into consideration the erga
omnes and multilateral treaty obligations that are the hallmark of
human rights law.
82 The balancing test is central to the concept of necessity. 178 It is the
very means through which necessity accounts for the disparity in the
importance of interests between States and "justifies a reversal of the
legal protection normally accorded to these interests, so that a socially
important interest shall not perish for the sake of respect for an
objectively minor right" or interest. 179 The test has traditionally been
cast in the mold of a bilateral relationship, that is to say, it was meant
for weighing the inconsistent interests of two States against each
other.18 0 Under this construction, interests of a community of States,
whether States parties to a relevant human rights convention or all
States of the international community when a customary erga omnes
obligation is involved, are underrepresented. This is of prime
importance in the field of international human rights law as
multilateral human rights obligations and customary erga omnes
obligations are, by definition, not only the interests of individual States,
but are correctly understood as interests of the entire community. 81
Individualizing these interests for the purposes of the balancing test
misrepresents their multilateral or erga omnes character. Thus, because
treating these interests as merely individual interests of the States of
the community is erroneous, the necessity calculus built into the
balancing test of the provisionally adopted draft article 33 yields
erroneous results. Consequently, a community interest in a given
human rights norm can be outweighed, as in the present example, by
an essential interest of a State. Article 33 can thus excuse the State's
disregard for that norm.
53 To adjust the necessity calculus, the collective or community
interest in seeing a particular human rights obligation honored, not the
individualized State interest in seeing that this is done, should be
178. See supra Sections III(D) (discussing the balancing requirement) and IV.D
(applying the balancing test to border closure).
179. BIN CHENG, supra note 27, at 74.
180. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
181. Recently, Dominic6 wrote: "A multilateral obligation is a legal duty whose
bearer-a state-is answerable before the entire international community. In other
words, breach of this obligation ... is something that concerns the international
community as a whole, principally all states." Dominic6, supra note 174, at 354.
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placed opposite the essential interest of the acting State.18 2 That is, the
test should not focus on obligations and interests as between two States
only, but, where relevant, as in the case of multilateral or erga omnes
obligations, the interests considered should be those of the entire
community of States having a legal interest in the matter. The
balancing test would thus locate the essential interest of the acting
State on one side of the scale while, on the other, there would be the
interest of all States parties to the given treaty or bound by a given
customary erga omnes obligation. Applying the balancing test in this
manner would more appropriately account for the interest of the
international community in seeing human rights norms honored and
could change the outcome of the test. The interest of the international
community in having non-refoulement honored, then, could possibly
outweigh the interest of a single State in closing its borders to protect
an essential interest and, in consequence, necessity would not be
available to justify a border closure in the face of an influx of asylum-
seekers.
Accordingly, the necessity balancing test should be revised to allow
for the proper consideration of interests of the entire community of
States in cases involving not merely bilateral relations of States, but
truly transnational interests, such as the protection of human rights.
Without reconceiving the concept of necessity to account for non-
bilateralizable interests of States, that is to say for community
interests, necessity could subvert the developing framework of human
rights protection, which, to a large measure, depends on the recognition
of erga omnes or multilateral obligations for its effectiveness. My
example of a mass-influx of asylum-seekers demonstrates this point-
applying necessity to a breach of the international obligation of non-
refoulement enables a State to disregard that fundamental principle of
refugee protection.
182. Judge Weeramantry called attention to this approach in connection with issues
of environmental protection. In his separate opinion in the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Case,
he wrote:
We have entered an era of international law in which international
law subserves not only the interests of individual States, but looks
beyond them and their parochial concerns to the greater interests of
humanity and planetary welfare. In addressing such problems, which
transcend the individual rights and obligations of the litigating States,
international law will need to look beyond procedural rules fashioned
for purely inter partes litigation.
When we enter the arena of obligations which operate erga omnes
rather than inter partes, rules based on individual fairness and
procedural compliance may be inadequate. The great ecological
questions now surfacing will call for thought upon this matter.
International environmental law will need to proceed beyond weighing
the rights and obligations of parties within a closed compartment of
individual State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of
humanity as a whole.
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85 Significantly, at its last session in the summer of 1999, forty-four
years into its work on State responsibility, the ILC has begun
consideration of an amendment to the provisionally adopted text of
draft article 33 that would reformulate the necessity balancing test.183
Under the guidance of Professor Crawford, the ILC's Special
Rapporteur on State responsibility since 1997, a drafting committee of
the ILC has provisionally recommended to the Commission as a whole
that article 33 be amended to include sub-paragraph 1(b)(ii). The first
paragraph of the amended article would, thus, read:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with
an international obligation of that State unless:
(a) The act is the only means of safeguarding an essential
interest of that State against a grave and imminent peril;
and
(b) The act does not seriously impair:
(i) An essential interest of the State towards which
the obligation existed; or
(ii) If the obligation was established for the protection
of some common or general interest, that
interest. 18 4
86 Crawford commented that the amendment would "make it clear
that the balance to be struck in cases where the obligation is
established in the general interest (e.g. as an obligation erga omnes) is
that very interest, and not the particular interest of the state which
happens to complain .... ,18 5
87 The ILC's latest report on its work notes that during debate on the
proposed reformulation of the balancing test "support was expressed for
the view that the criterion was not, in all cases, the individual interest
of the complaining State but the general interest protected by the
obligation."'18 6 It is, however, not settled that this view will prevail and
that the ILC will adopt the proposed change. 8 7 So that States not be
183. See 1999 ILC Report, supra note 60, paras. 374-91.
184. Id. n.218 (emphasis added); see also James Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 435, 437 (1999).
185. Crawford, supra note 184, at 459.
186. 1999 ILC Report, supra note 60, para. 382.
187. Note that in his concluding remarks on article 33 to the ILC, Crawford "pointed
to a clear consensus in the Commission in favour of providing the narrowest possible
definition of necessity in terms of precluding wrongfulness and also in favor of
maintaining the article adopted on first reading." Id. para. 388 (emphasis added).
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given to understand that they may justifiably protect their interests by
disregarding legal obligations of interest to the entire international
community, the ILC should adopt the proposed change. The
Commission's work on necessity would then represent both a
codification of international law and its progressive development,18 8 and
the concept of necessity would regain step with international law, which
increasingly contains multilateral and erga omnes obligations.
Necessity exists as a concept of international law because it has a 8
role to play as a "safety valve," as Ago has said, "to relieve the
inevitably untoward consequences of a concern for adhering at all costs
to the letter of the law."' 8 9 To the extent that the entire community's
interest is taken into account in the necessity calculus, as suggested
here and as now proposed to the ILC, the entire community should also
assist the affected State to comply with its international obligation and
not suffer the adverse consequences to its essential interest that it
fears. In the case of a State driven to close its borders in the face of a
large-scale influx of asylum-seekers due to fear of grave and imminent
peril to an essential State interest, the entire community of States
should contribute to the care of the asylum-seekers in that "front-line"
State and help ensure that the essential interest of that State is indeed
not harmed. This entails implementing practical structural solutions in
the way of burden-sharing mechanisms at the international level. It is
to be emphasized that this concern is separate, but foundational, to the
rebalancing of the necessity test. Both must be undertaken to ensure
that, in crisis situations, individual human rights guarantees and the
essential interests of third-party States are effectively protected.
In conclusion, I emphasize that the protection of human rights is a 89
responsibility shared by all members of a civilized community and that,
without sharing that responsibility, the community's humanitarian
objectives can hardly be met. Reconceiving the necessity balancing test
and cooperating to ensure protection of transnational interests is a step
toward overcoming what Philip Allott identified as "[a]mong the
clearest lessons of our collective experience, is that the concept of state
necessity is the most persistent and formidable enemy of a truly human
society."190
188. This would be in line with the mission of the ILC and its role in international
law. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing the mandate and function
of the ILC).
189. Ago Report, supra note 18, at 51.
190. Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29
HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 17 (1988).
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